تعادل‌های حمایتی یک جانبه در بازی ترکیبی بین سیاست‌گذار پولی، مالی و سفته‌باز در چارچوب تابع تعدیل شده لجستیک در فرم استراتژیک

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار اقتصاد، گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه ولی عصر رفسنجان، کرمان، ایران

2 دانشیار ریاضی، گروه ریاضی، دانشگاه ولی عصر رفسنجان، کرمان، ایران

چکیده

یکی از مباحثی که در طی دهه‌های اخیر توجه محققین را به خود جلب کرده است بررسی بازی ترکیبی و استراتژیک بین مقام مالی و مقام پولی با تاکید بر نقش بازیگر سوم یعنی مداخله‌گران بازار ارز در جهت دستیابی به سطح معینی از ثبات در شاخص‌های اقتصادی از جمله بازار ارز می‌باشد. از این رو هدف این مطالعه طراحی الگویی در چارچوب نظریه بازی بین این سه فعال اقتصادی است. در بازی در تلاش هستیم تا نقش فعالان بازار ارز (سفته بازان بازار ارز) در اقتصاد را به حداقل برسانیم. در این الگو دولت به دنبال دستیابی به بالاترین رشد اقتصادی با استفاده از اعمال سیاست‌های مالی، بانک مرکزی به دنبال رسیدن به ثبات قیمت‌ها از طریق اجرای سیاست‌های پولی و فعالان بازار ارز نیز به دنبال دستیابی به بالاترین کسب سود از طریق دخالت حداکثری در بازار ارز می‌باشد. برای این منظور در چارچوب یک الگوی ریاضی و با استفاده از تابع لجستیک تعدیل شده، تعادل نش و تعادل‌های حمایتی یک جانبه در بازی بررسی خواهند شد. در تعادل نش ترکیبی هر بازیکن به طور فردی به دنبال حداکثر کردن منفعت خود است، در حالی که در تعادل‌های حمایتی یک جانبه هدف هر بازیکن به حداکثر رساندن سود بازیکنی است که از آن حمایت می‌نماید. نتایج این بازی نشان می‌دهد که از شش سناریوی طراحی شده، در دو سناریوی اول و پنجم یعنی در بازی اصلی و بازی که در آن دولت از بانک مرکزی و بانک مرکزی نیز از دولت حمایت می‌نمایند، دخالت سفته بازان بازار ارز در اقتصاد به پایین‌ترین حد ممکن خود می‌رسد و در این سناریو تعادل حمایتی یک جانبه جایی است که در آن دولت و بانک مرکزی برای رسیدن به پایین‌ترین سطح از زیان خود استراتژی سیاست‌های مالی و پولی انقباضی را دنبال می‌کنند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Unilateral Support Equilibria in a Mixed Game among Monetary, Fiscal, and Speculator Policymakers within the Framework of the Modified Logistic Function in Strategic Form

نویسندگان [English]

  • Davoud Mahmoudinia 1
  • Davoud Foroutannia 2
1 Economic Department, Vali-e-Asr University of Rafsanjan, Rafsanjan Iran
2 Department of Mathematics, Vali-e-Asr University of Rafsanjan, Rafsanjan Iran
چکیده [English]

One of the topics that have attracted researchers' attention in recent decades is the analysis of the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, with emphasis on the role of a third actor—foreign exchange market interventionists—in achieving stability in key economic indicators, particularly in the foreign exchange market. The purpose of this study is to design a model based on game theory involving three economic actors. In this paper, we aim to minimize the influence of the speculator on the economy. The government aims to achieve maximum economic growth by implementing financial policies. Meanwhile, the central bank focuses on maintaining price stability through its monetary policies. Additionally, speculators look to generate the highest profits by actively intervening in the currency market. To achieve this, we will analyze the Nash equilibrium and the unilateral support equilibria in the game using a modified logistic function. In the Nash equilibrium, each player individually tries to maximize their own benefit. In contrast, in unilateral support equilibria, each player seeks to maximize their own profit (or minimize their own loss) while supporting the player they are backing. The design of this game has been analyzed in six scenarios. The results of this game-theoretic analysis reveal that, among the six designed scenarios, the first and fifth scenarios—specifically, the main game and the scenario where the government and central bank mutually support each other—exhibit the lowest possible level of involvement by currency market speculators. In these cases, unilateral support equilibria emerge, wherein both the government and the central bank adopt contractionary fiscal and monetary policy strategies to minimize their respective losses

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Game Theory
  • Unilateral Support Equilibria
  • Monetary and Fiscal Policy
  • Speculators

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