Analysis of QATAR's Asymmetric Behavior Productive in the World Gas Market

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

2 Ph.D Candidate Economics, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

Abstract

South Pars_North, The existence of the Dome gas field and the common membership of Qatar with Iran have given importance to analyzing Qatar's asymmetric behavior productively in the world gas market. Qatar's position in the world gas market and its excessive capacity in gas production provide an opportunity for an increase and decrease in the production of natural gas with changes in variables such as other members of the gas exporting countries production, shale gas production, world natural gas demand, world natural gas price, and the crude oil world price don't change to stabilize a systematic and aligned market. This paper investigated Qatar gas productive behavior using seasonal data from 2001 to 2021 and the autoregressive distributing (ARDL) method. The results showed that during changes (increase and decrease) in the mentioned variables, as the most important variables affecting the formation of changes in the supply and demand of world gas, Qatar Gas's productive behavior in the direction of aligned market stability will not change. And in the global gas market, Qatar shows similar behavior to Saudi Arabia in the worldwide oil market. Also, empirical results showed that in the long term, there is a significant relationship between Iran and Qatar gas production. By increasing Iran's natural gas production by one percent, Qatar's natural gas production will increase by less than one percent

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

  1.  

    1. Abbaspour Chahardeh, A. R., Delavari, M., & Babakhani, M. (2018). Investigating the effect of shale gas production in predicting the foreign exchange income of Iran's gas exports using econometric methods and dynamic systems. Quarterly Journal of Energy Economics Studies, 15(60), 129-162. (In Persian)
    2. Alhajji, A. F., & Huettner, D. (2000). OPEC and world crude oil markets from 1973 to 1994: cartel, oligopoly, or competitive?. The Energy Journal, 21(3), 31-60.‏
    3. Alkhathlan, K., Gately, D., & Javid, M. (2014). Analysis of Saudi Arabia's behavior within OPEC and the world oil market. Energy Policy, 64, 209-225.‏
    4. Apergis, N., & Payne, J. E. (2010). Natural gas consumption and economic growth: a panel investigation of 67 countries. Applied Energy, 87(8), 2759-2763.‏
    5. Al-Qahtani, A., Balistreri, E., & Dahl, C. (2008). Literature review on oil market modeling and OPEC’s behavior. Paper, Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines.‏
    6. Beyene, Z., & Wadley, I. L. (2004). Common goods and the common good: Transboundary natural resources, principled cooperation, and the Nile Basin Initiative.‏
    7. Dagoumas, A., Perifanis, T., & Polemis, M. (2018). An econometric analysis of the Saudi Arabia's crude oil strategy. Resources Policy, 59, 265-273.‏
    8. Delavari, M., & Babakhani, M. (2019). A Study of the Shale Gas Production Effect on Anticipating the Foreign Exchange Earnings of Iran Gas Export Using the Econometrics Method and Dynamic System. Quarterly Energy Economics Review, 15(60), 129-162.‏
    9. Dırıöz, A. O., & Erbıl, E. (2021). The Prospects of Natural Gas Organization in Light of Qatar's OPEC Exit: Some Critical Reflections. The Extractive Industries and Society, 8(2), 100703.‏
    10. Engevall, S., Göthe-Lundgren, M., & Värbrand, P. (1998). The traveling salesman game: An application ofcost allocation in a gas and oil company. Annals of Operations Research, 82(0), 203-218.‏
    11. Ezzati, A. (1976). Future OPEC price and production strategies as affected by its capacity to absorb oil revenues. European Economic Review, 8(2), 107-138.‏
    12. Feng, G. F., Wang, Q. J., Chu, Y., Wen, J., & Chang, C. P. (2021). Does the shale gas boom change the natural gas price-production relationship? Evidence from the US market. Energy Economics, 93, 104327.‏
    13. Finon, D. (2007). Russia and the" Gas-OPEC". Real or Perceived Threat?. Nei. Visions, 24, 1-23.‏
    14. Forneth, M. (2004). Powering foreign policy; the rule of oil in diplomacy and conflict, research fellow physicians for social responsibility. PSR Energy Security Initiative.‏
    15. Gabriel, S. A., Rosendahl, K. E., Egging, R., Avetisyan, H. G., & Siddiqui, S. (2012). Cartelization in gas markets: Studying the potential for a “Gas OPEC”. Energy economics, 34(1), 137-152.‏
    16. Griffin, J. M. (1985). OPEC behavior: a test of alternative hypotheses. The American Economic Review, 75(5), 954-963.‏
    17. Gülen, S. G. (1996). Is OPEC a cartel? Evidence from cointegration and causality tests. The Energy Journal, 17(2), 43-57.‏
    18. Hammoudeh, S., & Madan, V. (1995). Expectations, target zones, and oil price dynamics. Journal of Policy Modeling, 17(6), 597-613.‏
    19. Hnyilicza, E., & Pindyck, R. S. (1976). Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: The case of OPEC. European economic review, 8(2), 139-154.‏
    20. Holz, F., Von Hirschhausen, C., & Kemfert, C. (2008). A strategic model of European gas supply (GASMOD). Energy Economics, 30(3), 766-788.‏
    21. Huntington, H. G. (2009). World Natural Gas Markets And Trade: A Multi-Modeling Perspective. The Energy Journal, (Special Issue).‏
    22. Jones, C. T. (1990). OPEC behaviour under falling prices: implications for cartel stability. The Energy Journal, 11(3), 117-130.‏
    23. Loderer, C. (1985). A test of the OPEC cartel hypothesis: 1974–1983. The Journal of Finance, 40(3), 991-1006.‏
    24. Mabro, R. (1975). Can OPEC hold the line. OPEC and the World Oil Market: The Genesis of the 1986 Price Crisis, 13-21.‏
    25. MacAvoy, P. W. (1982). Crude oil prices as determined by OPEC and market fundamentals.‏
    26. Mead, W. J. (1979). The performance of government in energy regulations. The American Economic Review, 69(2), 352-356.‏
    27. Moran, T. (2016). Modeling OPEC behavior: economic and political alternatives. OPEC Behaviour and World Oil Prices, 94-130.‏
    28. Neumann, A. (2009). Linking natural gas markets-is LNG doing its job?. The Energy Journal, 30(1_suppl), 187-200.‏
    29. Esen, V., & Oral, B. (2016). Natural gas reserve/production ratio in Russia, Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan: A political and economic perspective. Energy Policy, 93, 101-109.‏
    30. Rosendahl, K. E., & Sagen, E. L. (2009). The global natural gas market: will transport cost reductions lead to lower prices?. The Energy Journal, 30(2), 17-40.‏
    31. Salehi-Isfahani, D. (1987). Testing OPEC behavior: Further results, Department of Economics. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and state University working paper, 87-01.‏
    32. Shahbaz, M., Lean, H. H., & Farooq, A. (2013). Natural gas consumption and economic growth in Pakistan. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 18, 87-94.‏
    33. ShakeriBostanabad, R., Karimpour, S., & EmamiMeybodi, M. (2019). Investigating Whether the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) Can be Considered a Cartel: Application of Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bound Test and the Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test. Quarterly Journal of Energy Economics Review, 19(2), 85-98. (In Persian)
    34. Wooldrage, J., M. (2013), introduction economics, a modern Approch, South-Wesrern Cengage Learning.

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics