Investigation of Profit-Loss Sharing and Fixed-Return Contracts Recovery Rate Using Game Theory Approach

Document Type : Research Paper


1 Ph.D. Candidates in Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad (International Campus)

2 Associate Professor of Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

3 Professor of Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

4 Assistant professor of Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad


In loan contracts with profit-loss sharing (PLS), both sides share not only its expected profit but they both have to bear its probable losses as well. But in fixed interest-based loan contracts, the bank is simply risk natural and transfer all contract risks to borrower. Although in Islamic Sharia only the former contracts are accepted, it is not used that much in practice. In words, common loan contracts even in Islamic countries do not comply with the Sharia. This paper, using a game theory model, attempts to compare profit of banks these two sort of contracts based on recovery rate of borrowers when we have not only adverse selection but also costly state verification. We show that Sharia-compliant contracts (e.g. PLS) have significantly higher recovery rate compared to fixed interest-based contracts. 


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