بررسی اثر القایی تعداد پزشکان و تخت­های بیمارستانی بر مخارج سلامت در ایران

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار اقتصاد دانشگاه تبریز

2 دانشگاه تبریز

چکیده


بر اساس قانون روئمر، به دلیل وجود تقاضای القایی سلامت، با افزایش تعداد تخت­های بیمارستانی و حتی پزشکان، مخارج سلامت بالا خواهد رفت. در این پژوهش سعی شده است با استفاده از داده­های تابلویی استان­های ایران در دوره 1388-1379 وجود تقاضای القایی توسط پزشکان در استان­های ایران مورد بررسی قرار گیرد. نتایج حاصل از برآورد مدل نشان می­دهد که تغییر تعداد پزشکان تأثیر مثبت و معنی­داری بر میزان مخارج سلامت استان­ها دارد. بنابراین وجود تقاضای القایی در بخش سلامت که به قانون روئمر معروف است، در استان­های کشور تأیید می­شود. اما در رابطه با تراکم تخت­های بیمارستانی این نتیجه حاصل شده­است که تقاضای القایی از جانب عرضه­کننده وجود ندارد و رابطه معکوسی بین این متغیر و مخارج سلامت مشاهده می­گردد. به علاوه نتایج حاصل از برآورد مدل، حاکی از آن است که متغیرهای تولید ناخالص داخلی و نرخ مرگ و میر رابطه مثبت و معنی­دار و متغیرهای آموزش، بیکاری و نرخ زاد و ولد رابطه معکوس و معنی­داری با مخارج سلامت استان­ها دارند. نسبت جمعیت بالای 65 سال و درجه شهرنشینی نیز اثر معنی­داری بر مخارج سلامت نداشته­اند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Inductive Effect of Physicians Number and Hospital Bed on Health Expenditures in Iran

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hossein Panahi 1
  • Behzad Salmani 1
  • Sima Nasibparast 2
1 Associate Professor of Economics, University of Tabriz
2 Ph.D. Student in Economics, University of Tabriz
چکیده [English]

According to Roemer's Law, due to induced demand in healthcare services, increasing the number of hospital beds, and even doctors, will make healthcare expenditures increased. Applying econometric analysis of panel data of Iran provinces over the period of 2001-2010, this study tries to investigate the existence of physician-induced demand in Iran. The results indicate that a change in the number of physicians has a significant positive impact on the provinces health expenditure. Therefore the existence of induced demand in Iran is confirmed. However, the results of examining the density of hospital beds show that there is no supplier-induced demand, and an inverse relationship is observed between the variable and health expenditure. The results also show that the variables of GDP and mortality rate have significantly positive relationship with health expenditure, while the variables of education, unemployment and fertility rate are significantly and inversely correlated with provinces health expenditure. Among the variables, fertility rate does not have the predicted sign and the proportion of population over 65 years and degree of urbanization also had no significant effect on health expenditure.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Health Expenditure
  • Induced Demand
  • Roemer Theory
  • Feldstein Theory
  • Iranian Provinces
  • Panel Data
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