مقایسه تطبیقی رژیم مالی قراردادهای جدید نفتی ایران (IPC) و قراردادهای مشارکت در تولید (PSC): مطالعه موردی میدان آزادگان جنوبی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری علوم اقتصادی دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد

2 استاد اقتصاد دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد

3 استادیار اقتصاد دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد

چکیده

در این مقاله برای نخستین بار رژیم مالی قراردادهای جدید نفتی ایران (IPC) و قراردادهای مشارکت در تولید شبیه‌سازی شده و مورد ارزیابی و مقایسه قرار می‌گیرد. روش‌ به کار رفته در این مقاله مبتنی بر رویکرد سناریو می‌باشد که در آن زمان‌بندی و حجم سرمایه‌گذاری به همراه پروفایل تولید ثابت فرض شده و اثر تغییر مؤلفه‌های مالی قرارداد بر متغیرهای کلیدی همچون نرخ بازدهی داخلی و دریافتی طرفین محاسبه می‌گردد. در این مطالعه از اطلاعات فنی و اقتصادی مربوط به طرح توسعه میدان آزادگان جنوبی جهت شبیه­سازی مالی استفاده شده است. یکی از مهمترین نتایج این مطالعه، امکان دستیابی به نتایج یکسان مالی و اقتصادی، صرف نظر از نوع قرارداد است. همچنین بر اساس نتایج این مطالعه، قراردادهای IPC از انعطاف‌پذیری و فزایندگی کمتری نسبت به قراردادهای مشارکت در تولید برخوردار بوده و جذابیت این قراردادها به خصوص در میادین با هزینه‌ سرمایه‌ای بالاتر کمتر است. دلیل این مسئله وجود برخی محدودیت‌های تعیین شده در قراردادهای نفتی ایران (IPC) همچون تقسیط بازپرداخت هزینه‌های سرمایه‌ای و طولانی‌تر بودن دوره بازگشت سرمایه و عدم ارتباط مستقیم میان دستمزد پیمانکار و درآمد حاصل از میدان می‌باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Comparative Analysis of Fiscal Terms of Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) and Production Sharing Contract (PSC): Case Study of South Azadegan Field

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hamed Sahebhonar 1
  • Mohammad Reza Lotfalipour 2
  • Mahmood Hooshmand 2
  • Mahdi Feizi 3
1 PhD Candidate in Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2 Professor of Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
3 Assistant Professor of Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
چکیده [English]

This paper simulates and compares the fiscal terms of Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) and Production Sharing Contract (PSC) for first time. The Scenario approach has been used, in which timing and the volume of investment and production profile are assumed as given and the effects of fiscal parameters of the contract on the key variables such as Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and take of the contractor are computed. This paper uses the technical and economic information of the South Azadegan field (phase II) as a case study for financial simulation. One of the significant results is the possibility of reaching the same economic and fiscal results regardless of the contract type. Another important result of this article is that the IPC fiscal regime is less flexible and progressive than PSC and is less attractive specifically in more capital intensive fields. The reason of this issue is some restriction in IPC such as amortization of the capital costs and having longer payback period and the lack of direct relation between IOC’s fee and the field revenue. 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Fiscal regime
  • Fiscal simulation
  • South Azadegan field
  • Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC)
  • Production Sharing Contract (PSC)
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