بررسی مقایسه‌ای کانال‌های تأثیرگذاری فساد بر رشد اقتصادی در اقتصادهای رانتی و غیر‏رانتی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه اقتصاد دانشگاه بوعلی سینا

2 استاد گروه اقتصاد دانشگاه بوعلی سینا

3 دانشجوی دکتری دانشگاه بوعلی سینا

چکیده

مطالعات تجربی قابل ‌توجهی جهت مشخص نمودن رابطه فساد و رشد ‌اقتصادی انجام ‌شده است، اما عمده مطالعات بر اثرات مستقیم فساد بر رشد اقتصادی متمرکز شده و پیرامون شناسایی کانال‌های تأثیرگذاری فساد بر رشد اقتصادی، مطالعات محدودی آن هم بیشتر با تمرکز بر یک کانال مشخص صورت پذیرفته است. هدف از انجام این پژوهش، بررسی کانال‏های تأثیرگذاری فساد بر رشد اقتصادی در اقتصادهای رانتی و غیر‏رانتی به‌ صورت همزمان و همچنین تعیین چگونگی اثرات متقابل آن‌ها برروی ‌هم است. برای این منظور، از داده‏های مرتبط با شاخص فساد راهنمای ریسک کشورهای بین­المللی (ICRG) و شاخص فساد کافمن و همکاران (Graft)، در 53 کشور منتخب با اقتصادهای رانتی و غیر‏رانتی، طی سال‏های 2013 – 1996 و همچنین بکارگیری روش تخمین معادلات همزمان (3SLS) استفاده ‌شده است. نتایج پژوهش نشان داد که هر دو نوع شاخص فساد، دارای اثر منفی بر رشد اقتصادی کشورهای مورد مطالعه هستند و انتقال اثر از طریق کانال‌های سرمایه‌گذاری، هزینه‌های دولت، بی‌ثباتی سیاسی و درجه باز بودن اقتصاد معنی‌دار است. همچنین در مقایسه بین کشورهای رانتی و کشورهای غیر‏رانتی، اثر فساد بر رشد اقتصادی با استفاده از دو شاخص فساد متفاوت است، به‌ طوری ‌که با در نظرگیری هر دو شاخص، اثر فساد در کشورهای غیر‏رانتی بیشتر از کشورهای رانتی دارای ذخایر منابع طبیعی طی سال‏های مورد مطالعه بوده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

A Comparative Study of Corruption's Effect Channels on Economic Growth in Rentier and Non Rentier Economies

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hamid Sepehrdoust 1
  • Mohammad Hassan Fotros 2
  • Adel Berjisian 3
1 Associate Professor of Economics, Bu-Ali-Sina University
2 Professor of Economics, Bu-Ali-Sina University
3 Ph.D. Student in Economics, Bu-Ali-Sina University.
چکیده [English]

Considerable empirical studies have been conducted to determine the relationship between corruption and economic growth, but these studies focused on the direct effects of corruption on economic growth and even more limited studies have been done on the impact of corruption on economic growth transition channels witch most of them just studied a specified channel. The main objective of present study was to evaluate the transition channels of corruption effect on economic growth simultaneously, in rentier and non-rentier economies and determine how their interactions on each other. To do this we used data of International Corruption Risk Guide (ICRG) index and Kaufman et al. (2000) corruption index (Graft) for 53 selected countries over the period 1996-2013 in this study. Also simultaneous equations 3SLS estimation method is used. The results indicate that, both types of corruption index has a negative impact on economic growth of the studied countries and impact transition through the channels of investment, government spending, political instability and economic openness are significant through both corruption index. Also, comparisons between rentier countries and non-rentier countries, shows that the effect of corruption on economic growth using two different corruption index is different, with both indices, the effects of corruption in rentier countries is bigger than non-rentier countries.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Corruption
  • Economic growth
  • Transition channels of corruption
  • Simultaneous equations system
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